The internet solved service discovery decades ago with DNS. You type a domain name, and a hierarchical system of registries resolves it to an IP address. Healthcare AI has no equivalent. When a triage agent in London needs to delegate a radiology interpretation to the most capable available agent - anywhere in the NHS, or across a federated European network - there is no lookup service. No trust chain. No way to verify capability, jurisdiction, or compliance status before opening a connection. GHARRA changes this.
GHARRA - the Global Healthcare Agent Registry and Routing Architecture - is the infrastructure layer we have been building at Symphonix-Health to answer a question that becomes more urgent with every new healthcare AI deployment: how do agents find each other?
This is not a theoretical problem. It is the bottleneck that will determine whether healthcare AI remains a collection of siloed point solutions, or becomes a composable, interoperable ecosystem capable of genuinely transforming patient outcomes at population scale.
The Discovery Problem
Consider the landscape today. A hospital deploys a triage agent. A pathology lab runs a diagnostic agent. A pharmacy network operates a medication-interaction agent. A national health authority maintains a population surveillance agent. Each of these agents was built by a different team, hosted on different infrastructure, authenticated through different mechanisms, and governed by different regulatory frameworks.
Now imagine you want them to work together on a single patient journey - say, a suspected sepsis case that requires immediate triage, rapid blood panel analysis, antibiotic interaction checking, and a notification to the regional public health authority. The current state of the art is bilateral integration: point-to-point API contracts negotiated between each pair of organisations. In a network of n agents, that is n(n-1)/2 integration agreements. For 50 agents, that is 1,225 bilateral contracts. For 500, it is 124,750.
This does not scale. It never has. The internet faced exactly this problem with hostnames in the 1980s, and the answer was a hierarchical, federated registry: DNS. Healthcare AI needs its own equivalent, built from the ground up for the unique constraints of clinical systems - jurisdictional sovereignty, regulatory compliance, cryptographic trust verification, and the absolute prohibition on exposing patient data through discovery infrastructure.
The Four Failures of Bilateral Integration
No dynamic capability matching. When a clinical agent needs a specific capability - say, FHIR R4 ClinicalImpression generation from a dermatology image - it has no way to query which agents in the network can provide that capability right now, with what latency, under what jurisdictional constraints, and at what trust level. Endpoints are hardcoded. Capabilities are documented in PDFs, if at all.
No cross-organisation trust verification. Even when two agents discover each other's existence, there is no standardised way to verify that the remote agent is who it claims to be, that it holds the certifications it advertises, or that those certifications are current. Trust is established through legal agreements and manual certificate exchange - processes that take weeks or months.
No jurisdictional routing. A clinical agent in Germany cannot programmatically determine which agents it is legally permitted to communicate with under GDPR, which require Standard Contractual Clauses, and which are in jurisdictions with adequacy decisions. This information lives in legal departments, not in machine-readable metadata.
No graceful degradation. When an agent goes offline, there is no automatic failover to an equivalent agent. There is no health scoring, no priority weighting, no capability-aware fallback routing. The integration simply fails, and a human must intervene.
How GHARRA Works
GHARRA is a three-tier federated registry that maps the organisational structure of global healthcare. Like DNS, it is hierarchical, delegated, and eventually consistent. Unlike DNS, it carries cryptographic trust material, regulatory attestations, and capability metadata alongside every record.
The Three Tiers
Root Registry - The global root, operated by Symphonix-Health from infrastructure in Ireland (EU jurisdiction, GDPR native). The root maintains the authoritative list of sovereign registries, their delegation records, and the global trust anchor chain. It does not store individual agent records. It stores pointers to the sovereign registries that do.
Sovereign Registries - National or regional registries operated by health authorities, standards bodies, or delegated operators. Examples: NHS Digital for GB, the ONC for US, gematik for DE, the Ministry of Health for KE. Each sovereign registry manages the agent records for its jurisdiction, enforces local regulatory requirements, and participates in the federated discovery protocol. Sovereign registries are authoritative for their namespace - gb.gharra.health, us.gharra.health, de.gharra.health.
Organisational Registries - Individual healthcare organisations register their agents within their sovereign namespace. An NHS Trust might register agents under guy-st-thomas.gb.gharra.health. Mayo Clinic under mayo.us.gharra.health. The HSE under hse.ie.gharra.health. Organisational registries manage their own agent lifecycle - registration, capability updates, deprecation, decommissioning - within the policy constraints set by their sovereign.
Agent Capability Cards
Every agent registered in GHARRA publishes a capability card - a structured, machine-readable document that describes what the agent can do, how to reach it, and how to verify it. The card includes the agent's namespace and unique identifier, its supported protocols (A2A, MCP, FHIR, HL7v2), its capability tags (triage, radiology, pharmacy, genomics), its trust material (JWKS endpoint, mTLS certificate chain, DPoP configuration), its regulatory attestations (CE marking, FDA clearance, ISO 13485), its health status and performance metrics, and its jurisdictional compliance tags.
Capability cards are signed by the registering organisation and countersigned by the sovereign registry. This creates a verifiable chain: any agent in the network can validate that a capability card was issued by a legitimate organisation within a legitimate sovereign, and that the sovereign is recognised by the global root.
Federated Discovery Performance
GHARRA is advisory, not runtime proxy. It tells you where agents live and provides cryptographic bundles to verify them. Agents communicate directly, peer-to-peer.
This is a critical architectural decision. GHARRA never sits in the data path. It never proxies agent-to-agent traffic. It never sees clinical payloads. It is a directory service that provides discovery results and cryptographic verification material. Once a calling agent has resolved its target and validated the trust chain, all subsequent communication happens directly between the two agents. This eliminates GHARRA as a single point of failure, removes it as a latency bottleneck, and - most importantly - ensures it never handles patient data.
Cryptographic Trust at Scale
Discovery without trust is dangerous. Knowing where an agent lives is useless if you cannot verify that it is genuinely operated by the organisation it claims, that it holds the certifications it advertises, and that its behaviour is auditable. GHARRA implements trust through four layered mechanisms, each building on the one below.
Tier 1 - Authentication
Proving identity at every boundaryGHARRA supports four authentication mechanisms, selected based on the security requirements of the interaction. JWT bearer tokens with RS256, ES256, or EdDSA signing provide stateless, verifiable identity claims. Mutual TLS (mTLS) with certificate binding per RFC 8705 ensures transport-level authentication where both parties present X.509 certificates. Demonstration of Proof-of-Possession (DPoP) tokens per RFC 9449 bind access tokens to specific cryptographic keys, preventing token replay and theft. API key tiers provide a simpler mechanism for lower-sensitivity internal queries.
verify_jwt(
token,
algorithms=["RS256", "ES256", "EdDSA"],
issuer="gb.gharra.health",
audience="root.gharra.health",
require_claims=["sub", "scope", "org_id"]
)
Tier 2 - Attestations
Third-party signed capability proofsAttestations are signed statements from recognised third parties - regulators, certification bodies, accreditation agencies - that assert specific facts about an agent. An attestation might state that an agent has been CE-marked as a Class IIa medical device, that it has passed ISO 13485 quality management certification, or that it has been cleared by the FDA under the 510(k) pathway. Each attestation includes the issuer identity, the claims being made, a digital signature, and an expiry date. GHARRA verifies attestation signatures against a maintained list of trusted issuers and automatically flags expired or revoked attestations.
issuer: "bsi-group.com"
type: "iso_13485"
subject: "triage-agent.guy-st-thomas.gb"
claims:
scope: "AI-assisted clinical triage"
classification: "Class IIa"
issued: "2025-11-01"
expires: "2026-10-31"
signature: "eyJhbGciOi..."
Tier 3 - Policy Engine
9 ABAC rule categories governing every interactionThe GHARRA policy engine evaluates every discovery request against nine categories of Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) rules. These are not binary allow/deny gates - they are nuanced policy evaluations that consider the full context of the interaction. The nine categories are: jurisdiction (is cross-border communication permitted between these two zones?), protocol compatibility (do both agents support a common wire protocol?), trust level (does the caller meet the minimum trust tier required by the target?), organisational scope (is the caller within the target's permitted organisation set?), time-of-day restrictions (is the interaction permitted at this hour under local policy?), consent status (has the requisite patient consent been recorded?), FHIR mandate (does the interaction satisfy mandatory FHIR resource requirements?), rate tier (is the caller within its allocated request budget?), and emergency break-glass (does the interaction qualify for emergency override of normal policy constraints?).
result: PERMIT
rules_evaluated: 9
rules_passed: 9
break_glass: false
jurisdiction: {from: "gb", to: "ie", basis: "adequacy"}
trust_level: {required: 3, actual: 4}
Tier 4 - Transparency Ledger
Append-only audit trail with cryptographic integrityEvery registration, update, attestation change, and policy decision in GHARRA is recorded in an append-only transparency ledger. Each entry is SHA-256 hashed and chained to the previous entry, creating a tamper-evident log that can be independently verified. At regular intervals, Merkle tree checkpoints are computed and published, allowing any participant to efficiently verify the integrity of the entire ledger without downloading it. The ledger design satisfies the audit requirements of ISO 27001 and the traceability mandates of the EU AI Act, Article 12. Critically, the ledger records metadata about registry operations - which agents were registered, which attestations were updated, which policies were evaluated - but never clinical data, patient identifiers, or interaction payloads.
sequence: 847291
timestamp: "2026-02-14T09:31:44Z"
operation: "AGENT_REGISTERED"
subject: "sepsis-screener.nhs-london.gb"
hash: "a3f8c2d1e5b9..."
prev_hash: "7b2e4f6a8c1d..."
merkle_root: "d4e5f6a7b8c9..."
patient data stored in the registry - GHARRA is PHI-free by design
The 13-Point Route Admission Gate
Before GHARRA returns a discovery result - before it tells a calling agent where a target agent lives and how to verify it - the request passes through thirteen sequential admission checks. Every check must pass. A failure at any point terminates the resolution with a structured error indicating which gate failed and why. The thirteen gates are:
- Active Record - The target agent's registration must be in an active state. Expired, suspended, or decommissioned records are excluded.
- Namespace Validation - The target's fully qualified namespace must parse correctly and resolve within the registry hierarchy.
- Zone Delegation - The sovereign registry responsible for the target's zone must have a valid, unexpired delegation from the root.
- Trust Anchor Verification - The trust anchor chain from the target's organisational registry through its sovereign to the root must be cryptographically valid.
- JWKS Availability - The target agent's JSON Web Key Set endpoint must be reachable and must return at least one valid signing key.
- Thumbprint Matching - The key thumbprint in the target's capability card must match a key in the resolved JWKS.
- Certificate-Bound Token Validation - If the caller presents a certificate-bound token, the certificate must match the token's
cnfclaim. - Policy Tag Evaluation - The target's policy tags must be compatible with the caller's requested interaction scope.
- Jurisdiction Check - The caller's jurisdiction and the target's jurisdiction must have a permissible communication basis (adequacy decision, SCCs, or same-jurisdiction).
- Federated Trust Level - The caller's computed trust level must meet or exceed the target's minimum required trust level.
- Protocol Compatibility - At least one wire protocol must be supported by both the caller and the target.
- Feature Flag Evaluation - Any feature flags required by the target must be enabled for the caller's organisation.
- Transport Endpoint Liveness - The target's declared transport endpoint must respond to a health check within the configured timeout.
Design Principle
GHARRA never touches patient data. PHI content scanning - three-layer detection using regex patterns, structural FHIR analysis, and audit ledger review - runs at the gateway to actively block any payload containing health identifiers. The registry is PHI-free by architectural mandate, not by policy request.
If a payload containing patient identifiers ever reaches the registry boundary, it is rejected, the attempt is logged in the transparency ledger, and the calling organisation's security team is notified.
Cross-Border Discovery in Practice
The real test of a federated registry is not whether it works within a single organisation or a single country. It is whether it works across borders - where jurisdictions differ, regulations conflict, and trust must be established between parties that have never previously interacted. GHARRA's cross-border discovery protocol uses a three-phase pattern we call Prune-Scatter-Gather.
Phase 1: Prune
When a calling agent issues a discovery query - "find me an agent capable of FHIR R4 dermatology classification in a GDPR-adequate jurisdiction" - the first step is to eliminate sovereign registries that cannot possibly contain a match. Each sovereign registry publishes a Bloom filter summarising its registered capability tags. The root registry maintains these Bloom filters and uses them to prune the candidate set before any network requests are issued. In practice, this eliminates 90-95% of sovereigns from consideration, reducing a global query to a handful of targeted lookups.
Phase 2: Scatter
The pruned candidate set receives parallel queries. Each sovereign registry evaluates the query against its local agent records, applying its own policy constraints, and returns a ranked result set. These queries are issued concurrently, with configurable timeouts and fallback behaviour. If a sovereign registry fails to respond within the timeout, its results are excluded and a degradation marker is attached to the response, informing the caller that the result set may be incomplete.
Phase 3: Gather
Results from all responding sovereign registries are merge-sorted by a composite score incorporating priority (explicit operator-assigned ranking), weight (load-balancing distribution), and health score (recent uptime, latency percentiles, error rates). The merged result set is paginated using federated cursor pagination - cursors that encode the position within each sovereign's result set - so that callers can efficiently page through large cross-border result sets without repeated full queries.
The Capability Routing Index
To accelerate repeated queries, GHARRA maintains a Capability Routing Index (CRI) - a distributed, eventually-consistent index that maps capability tags to sovereign registries. The CRI is built from the Bloom filters and augmented with frequency counts and freshness timestamps. When a calling agent queries for a common capability like "fhir-r4-patient-summary," the CRI can resolve the query directly from cached metadata without issuing any scatter queries to sovereigns. CRI entries have a configurable TTL and are invalidated when sovereign registries publish updated Bloom filters.
The federation model means no single organisation - not even Symphonix-Health - has a complete view of all registered agents. Sovereignty is not just a label; it is an architectural guarantee. Each nation controls its own registry, its own policies, and its own agent data.
From Registry to Revenue
GHARRA is open-source infrastructure, but infrastructure requires sustainable funding. The commercialisation model mirrors the structure of the registry itself: tiered, transparent, and aligned with the value delivered.
Organisations pay to register and maintain their agents in the registry. Registration includes capability card hosting, attestation verification, trust anchor management, and SLA-backed uptime guarantees. Pricing scales with the number of registered agents and the frequency of capability card updates.
Workspaces provide isolated environments for development, staging, and production agent management. Organisations can maintain separate workspaces for testing federated discovery without affecting their production registrations.
Agent chains - complex multi-agent workflows that involve discovery, verification, and routing across multiple registries - are metered on a credit-based billing model. Each discovery resolution consumes credits proportional to the number of sovereigns queried and the complexity of the policy evaluation. Credits are purchased in advance or billed monthly.
Subscription tiers provide predictable pricing for organisations with stable, high-volume discovery needs. Tiers include bundled credits, priority support, dedicated sovereign registry instances, and custom policy rule development.
The principle is straightforward: the registry is free to query for basic lookups. Advanced features - cross-border federation, real-time health scoring, attestation verification, custom policy rules - are commercial services that fund the continued development and operation of the global infrastructure.
Healthcare AI will not scale through bilateral agreements between every hospital and every agent provider. It will scale through a shared registry - the same way the internet scaled through DNS.
We built GHARRA because we could not find it. Every agent we deployed at Symphonix-Health - every triage agent, every clinical decision support agent, every population health monitor - needed to discover and verify other agents. And every time, the answer was the same: hardcode the endpoint, manually exchange certificates, hope the compliance team had signed off. That is not infrastructure. That is improvisation.
GHARRA replaces improvisation with architecture. A hierarchical, federated, cryptographically verifiable registry that lets healthcare AI agents find each other the way web services have found each other for thirty years - through a shared, trusted directory. The DNS for healthcare AI. Open-source, PHI-free, built for a world where clinical agents are not isolated tools but participants in a global, interoperable healthcare network.
The registry is live. The protocol is documented. The code is open. Build with us.